

SOUTH-EAST EUROPE: AN UPCOMING REGION

Recommendations

The articles, essays and analysis that appear in these pages do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers will sympathize with all the sentiments they find here, for some of our authors will disagree with each other, but we do expect understanding for promotion of divergent ideas. We do not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any article, signed or unsigned, that appears in these pages. What we do accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear.

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Dear readers,

In the previous analyses of the Foreign Policy Initiative of Bosnia-Herzegovina, we had tried to objectify causes and consequences of the situation Bosnia-Herzegovina has found itself in. Our conclusions give support to the theory of identity crisis, lack of vision and overemphasised international interventionism. Is there an exit? Mr. Nerzuk Curak, PhD, professor at the Sarajevo Faculty of Political Science and publicist, shows that this is not only a phenomenon tied to Bosnia-Herzegovina, but a syndrome that has intoxicated, to a varying extent, the whole Balkans. In our fourth analysis, Mr. Curak mixes a "sobering-up" cocktail whose main ingredient should be the creation of a regional common identity. But, like in the Ayurvedic medicine, the main ingredient will only work in a well balanced symbiosis with a multitude of other, smaller, but, nevertheless, still essential components. However, this analysis does not dwell that far, but that does not mean that we may not make this step soon.

It does, however, define several important aspects of the present and future geopolitical situation of the South-East Europe, and, hence, Bosnia-Herzegovina, as its integral part.

Small Balkans with big nationalisms, whose bad spirits can be controlled only by a foreign factor/tutor, is loosing another battle at the, as Curak puts it, glocal level. It is loosing its global battle because, due to its fragmentation, it cannot make an impression on the two global powers, the USA and the EU, who still treat the Balkans as an post-conflict geopolitical entity. The local battle is being lost because nationalisms are "eating their offspring" and create crises that enable the USA and the EU to treat us as permanently post-conflict societies deprived of vision and inner strength.

It is, therefore, imperative to create small Balkans without big nationalisms, built into a strong idea of regionalism, that is able to overcome the rigidity of local nationalisms. "Regionalism is the strength that re-establishes European normalcy, the way it existed in the pre-nationalist Europe", concludes Curak.

Theory!? Of course!

But, aren't we in need of just that – a theory that will detach us from the "pragmatic" political rhetoric reduced to a confusing self-immersed bureaucratic terminology that yields no vision. Even if this theory is just an utopia.

We would like to use this opportunity to express our gratitude to the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, and Mr. Michael Weichert in particular, for their continuing support, without which we would struggle in our efforts.

Editorial board
Sarajevo, July 2006

Setting the problem

Does South-East Europe, as a region still governed by an external subject of geo-political power (the international community in its various modalities) have any future at all? If we would accept only historical causality, the answer to this question would rather be negative, than positive. However, isn't Wittgenstein right when he treats the absolutisation of causality as mere superstition? Even the idea of Europe, let alone the idea of its institutions as a practical human purpose, would unreservedly fail, if causality would be the measure of all things, and if there would be no *moderate discontinuities in the philosophy of history and social science* (Cazes, 1992, pp. 209-266). This discontinuity is a result of the prospective insight and far-sightedness of European genius that confronted, after WWII, the rules set by historical causality.

Similar is the task that lies before the Balkan genius: to get rid - after the recent wars - of negative causality. But, how could it be done? *My solution does not accept mercy: slow building of the region of South-East Europe (putting an end to the national "dramas of sovereignty" through the independence of Kosovo² and Montenegro)*, in which all those nationally divided, mutually alienated "companions" would be able to live together again in a less burdened historical context, in order to become, at a later stage, part of a great united Europe" (Nooteboom, 2005, 31-32). As independent states of the region of South-East Europe, rather than as autarchic, independent states. Without this regional attribute that intuitively emphasizes the possibility of overcoming (in a theoretical discourse) the last modern eschatology: nation-states, through supra-national regionalization, as *glocalization*, the term Robertson has coined to reconcile global and local. (Robertson, Beck, 2003, pp. 118-119)

In our case, the regional is a synthesis of global and local, a possible "glocal culture" (Beck, 2003, p. 120), with its important *epi-local* back-waters. But our theoretical conquest of a new *field of inquiry* is nothing but a futile endeavour if the scientific prediction is not based on realistic assumptions.

That is why the contemporary perspective, both in Europe and in the United States of America, deals with reality that includes eight key themes: *environment or eco-sphere, geopolitical context, global economic growth, demographic behaviours, evolution of values,*

² Formal sovereignty of Kosovo (even at the cost of the new theoretical premises of international and European law) is impossible in the geo-political projection of mid-term and long-term future of Serbia. Although, and despite the breakdowns that such a development could cause among the Serb political and intellectual elites, I consider that a reasonable and rational solution to the Bosnian issue, without anachronous geo-political conditions put up by Belgrade, is more important for the future of Serbia (and of BiH, for that matter), I do appreciate the counter-arguments, such as: „Although, for Serbia, Bosnia still represents one of the inextricable knots, particularly with regards to the reconciliation process that is so much delayed, as well as to the crimes committed in the 90-es, and the arrest and trials to the two most notorious individuals indicted for war crimes – Karadžić and Mladić – the most difficult problem for Serbia is still the issue of the status of Kosovo.» (Zanoni, 2004, p. 98)

technological changes, employment and patron-state (Cazes, 1992, pp. 420- 421), i.e., the supra-national structures in the era of globalization.

In this paper, we are interested in geo-political context we are analysing, taking - as the point of departure - Aron's idea that "there is 'such a configuration of power relations that most of political units gather around two of them, which then exceed in their power the power of all other units'" (Aron, Cazes, 1992, p. 422)

In South-East Europe, small political units (independent states) are gathered around the USA and the European Union, appreciating the geo-political context in which the total sum of the power of these two exceeds the "power of other units". These two powers, in their joint, as well as in separate arrangements, advise the countries of the region, driven by different motives, to strive for the future membership in the European Union, which, therefore, in geo-political context manifests itself as creative force of the future, with an objectivised tendency to rise above - with its power (which should neither be reduced to, nor treated only as the military power) - the power of the other reference unit - the USA - in the space of the *Old World*, thus proving that Aron's *dualistic formula of the capacity of powers* is of relative value. This is what the American follower of Spengler, Charles Kupchan has to say about it: "While Europe is more and more sticking to her course, and United States keep rejecting the compromise solution, the international institutions that have been helping the promotion of peace and progress since World War II until our days, will inevitable weaken. As Europe continues expanding to the East, it will prevail in the geo-politics of Eurasia and gradually push America out, as an arbiter of strategic *heartland*... History does come back to us, after having made a full circle. It is now Europe's turn to rise above, and distance itself from America, which refuses to hand over the privileges of priority. Europe will inevitable rise up to its opponent - America. If Washington and Brussels would be ready to start showing awareness of the danger of this growing gap between them, they might be able to suppress their growing competition and opposition. However, if they fail to prepare for the life after the Pax Americana, they would make sure that the upcoming conflict of civilizations would not occur between the West and the rest of the world, but within the West, divided from within (Kupchan, 2003, p. 84)

In this catastrophic projection, South-East Europe will be completely lost. That is why, in my view, it is of exceptional importance to create theoretical and practical conditions for the West *not to slip down historically*, which affirms the urgency of geo-political symbiosis of the European Union and the USA: "Using anti-Americanism to define Europe, just like ancient Athenians defined themselves vis à vis Persians, or Europeans did the same vis à vis the Arabs, Tatars or Turks, this is the strategy that destroys the prospect of Europe that could emerge as credible partner in the international arena. The role of intellectual debate on the future of Europe consists of the fact that there is an urge to 'cross the pillars of Heracles and to produce ideas and visions that would have strength enough to

indicate, in a realistic manner, the direction that should be taken, and incite imagination for the creation of a powerful, courageous and bright Europe." (Geremek, 2003, p. 92)

Is the European Union, which manages the crisis in the post-conflict region of South-East Europe, the forerunner of this, hopefully, "powerful, courageous and bright Europe"? The positive answer to this question greatly depends on the capability of the *Brussels Entity* to transform geo-political crisis in our region within the shortest possible timeframe into geo-economic development and cultural cooperation. This is an exceptional demand that touches the very foundation of European attitude towards South-East Europe. Namely, the presence and actions of the European Union in the Western Balkans in the first decade of the 21st century are still focused on the sphere of security³, as preliminary basis for political and economic agendas. This means that, in the perception of the European Union, it is still considered to be a (post)conflict, rather than as a developing region. The dichotomy between post-conflict community and developing community affects the *security dilemma*: (Duffy, 2003, p. 8), where, on the one hand, non-material aspects of ethnic violence are still present due to the lack of trust manipulated by national elites (which only strengthens the security paradigm), whereas, on the other hand, the region shows the potential to overcome - through civic structures existent in different communities - the *demons of history* (thus strengthening the *development paradigm*).

It is due to this dilemma that South-East Europe still dominantly represents the security interest of the Western European countries, realised through *geo-politics of enlargement*, i.e. expansion of the European security order to the region outside the European Union, so that, on the one hand, the EU can gain geo-political relevance and geo-strategic respect of the USA, and, on the other, applying the strategy of expanding the European security order to the region of the Western Balkans, the countries of that region - as political communities incapable of realising themselves to the full meaning of the term⁴ - *can be covered* by the common security strategy. This concept reminds us of the American *containment strategy* – the Cold War "siege" of the USSR aimed at preventing the breakthrough of "the Reds" from *heartland* into *rimland*: the United States have extended their influence first politically and then culturally, and only after that, by establishing a series of alliances, e.g. (NATO in Europe, CENTO in Western Asia, SEATO in South-Eastern Asia, ANZUS in the Pacific), in order to "shut off" the USSR.

European Union is now doing something similar, but for totally different reasons: to expand to the Western Balkans and make it interested both semantically in the West

³ This was recently pointed out, as it was reported by the Sarajevo daily *Oslobođenje*, by Gerald Knaus, President of European Stabilization Initiative (ESI), in which he warns Brussels that there is the danger of *ghettoization of the Balkans*, which is "still perceived by the EU as an unstable region in terms of security, rather than as part of the future European economy. That is why the EU has money available to fund expensive European Police Mission to BiH, and not for agricultural programs, such as those that were implemented in Romania and Bulgaria".

⁴ «Since, as it was nicely put by the Carnegie Commission, the Balkans is a region that did not justify the trust of the big powers that it is capable of taking care of its own affairs». (Lakičević, 2002, p. 223)

(Western Balkans, South-East Europe), only to shut off, through a lasting presence, this (post)conflict region, thus creating a new limes: the one that separates successful from failed states. *Enlargement*, followed by *containment*! The message is clear: South-East Europe is “doomed” to constitute itself as “western value” (not as some other value), with a lasting, conditioned, bureaucratized, yet indispensable support of the European Union. Or, as it was so poignantly formulated in the *Report Balkan 2010*: “Setting the Balkans irreversibly on the path to EU standards of governance by 2010 requires a broad range of coordinated activities by the stakeholders in five key areas: 1) re-evaluation and clarification of the objectives of international community and reorganization of the structure of the international presence in the region; 2) establishment of the rule of law and development of the system of criminal and civil justice that are - and are perceived to be - fair and effective for all citizens; 3) restructuring of economies, including the banking and taxation, trade and pension systems; 4) return or resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in a way that respects individual choice, and 5) reform of education and establishment of a vigorous civil society, including free and responsible press. Accomplishing these objectives will require coordinated engagement of a cohesive international community, working in tandem with reformist local leaders”, (2002, p. 23, underlined by N. Č.)

In such a regional constellation, this is still the engagement of a governor.

Crisis management in the South-East Europe

After the conflicts that occurred - from one country to another - ranging in intensity, and *marking* the region with the metaphor of *balkanization* as the ultimate eschatological misfortune, the Western Balkans has entered into a post-conflict state, whose key determinant is crisis. It is difficult to define, since the structure of crisis depends of the will of internal (regional) political protagonists to overcome it by accepting compromise. Since, in the Balkans, the compromise is reached only by external moderation, the USA and the European Union are forced to manage the crisis in South-East Europe for their own geo-political, geo-economic and security reasons.

What is the crisis management in the South-East Europe?

Besides the organisation of defence and promotion of stability, the crisis management is the third key dimension of security as perceived by security theories, and it is of direct relevance for this discussion. These three dimensions are mutually related and conditioned since each depends on the previous one. The South-East Europe imposes itself as a regional security experimental procedure in which these three dimensions of security may be theoretically researched and practically modelled.

The crisis management, perceived in a mid-term perspective, is the most important (geopolitical) dimension of security for the region of South-East Europe, because it relates, to terrorism, organised crime, corruption, trafficking, arms proliferation, and *soft crime* (Internet crime, stealing of intellectual property, artworks, etc.), as well as to natural and other disasters, on the one hand, and, on the other, to the control of potential causes of ethnic and international conflicts, giving rise, in the overall management, to the stability as an important regional factor of balance without which there can be no flows of capital. The capital fluctuation is of enormous importance for the region marked by poverty, so that the production of stability becomes the regional goal of the strategic power (i.e. *Euro-Atlantic alliance*), which, despite its inner controversies, actually does manage the crisis using different forms of security management.

When we depart from this *strategic milieu* to the level of international relations and international security, it means concretely that the crisis management in the South-East Europe is created - either jointly or separately - by international security organizations, authorized by political decisions of the United Nations, the USA and the European Union, which predominantly insist upon education, capacity-building, and cooperation of the national security institutions, yet under their managerial auspices. This is an expected type of action to which professional security factors in the countries of this region react with humble servitude, without offering any arrangements for new security openings.

Let us take the example of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an experimental country in crisis management. We are interested in the starting of the new mission of EUFOR. December 2, 2004 marked a new breakthrough for the European security concept that, for the first time in history, explores its scopes in a robust capacity of power, where else - but in an experimental country. The function of Bosnia and Herzegovina, since the signing of Dayton agreement up to the present has been reduced to the exploring of different political, economic, security and other arrangements and engagements of the international community, while in the actual stage the European Union is testing the idea of a possible constitution of its on security agenda on the Bosnian example and in Bosnian territory. Incompetence, ignorance, arrogance, bribery and other negative attributes of domestic politicians holding highest decision-making positions, brought about lack of sensitivity with regards to the importance of BiH as a laboratory state.

Different forms of acting of the international community - U. S. and in particular European Union, as a new geopolitical entity relatively independent from America, in the territory of BiH, offered to political structures in power a strategic possibility that very few countries in the history (in particular small ones) have ever had. Yet, instead of presenting their requests, BiH politics focused on *begging for donations*. What an absence of awareness of the State reason! Such a reaction can be understood, since the incentive to explore new models of international relations and new models of security should come primarily from theory, research centres and the academia. Such an encouragement

cannot come from conservative scientists loyal to their national policies or researchers who refuse to think about international relations and security beyond the inherited patterns. It means – in order to ensure scientific credibility (so indispensable) to theoretical research in the field of international relations and security, such a research work has to be reflected upon and built from new perspectives.

Production of regional identity

In the modern world borders have lost their inherited meaning. They are not any more borders of utmost division. In spite of retrograde political nomenclatures that only recognise the call of the land, borders are in the *process of movement*, so that we can say that borders are the space “in between”, that “separates by connecting” (Zanini, 2002, 9). This is a necessary, if not a sufficient condition to think about new identity of the border between states, and to inspire a new life into that “absurd cartography”, as Zanini puts it. If the borders between the former Yugoslav countries, after the political stage when they “connected by separating” (SFRJ), moved to the new stage - to connect the divided (and they did), the next progressive step would be about the production of regional identity in different spheres of human acting, including the sphere of security.

What is the new regional identity in the sphere of security? That identity implies and requires a strong theoretical foundation in order to reach the world of practice. In order to reach the world of practice, the regional identity of security had to be based on a different paradigm than the inherited ones, a paradigm that I call the *security turn*.

The security turn is a result of a linguistic and spatial turn. Southeast Europe produces its language, its space and its security. That security is inseparable from the security of the countries in the region, but it overarches, connects and redefines them, crossing the threshold of cooperation between national security systems, constituting a new security system of the South-East Europe. The security turn implies the evolution and transfer of security modalities within which new security forms are being explored. Why, for instance, wouldn't South-East Europe have its army (primarily to participate in peace operations and regional crises caused by non-political productions) and why wouldn't that security form be explored within the assumed integration model?

Our region is condemned to explore its own self. It is not recognised by the European Union and U.S.A. (in the sense of an acceptable cooperative identity) like other regions: for example, like Visegrad group in Central Europe or like CEFTA. It is simply unrecognised and the political construction of the name of the South-East Europe by Brussels is aimed at creating assumptions for the recognition of the Western Balkans as a European region. However, that means at the same time the separation of the region from the European Union and, in order to prevent individual accession of the countries of

the region into its alliance (maybe with exception of Croatia), its inserting into the South-East Europe, treated as the *third Europe*.⁵

Third Europe is a geopolitical problem for the first Europe and the first problem for itself. Unless there is a merger of different Europes, "there might mean that there will be no Europe at all - there will only be capitalism". (Stojanovic, 1997, 363)

In order to overcome this negative picture, South-East Europe must journey into its possibility. It means that it should build its own *regional trans-nationality* beyond national ideological interpretations in order to become a trans-national player capable of managing crises in its own yard! There are no reasons, except those that are undeniably limited by the inherited patterns of thought, for every radical scenario to be perceived as negative. That means that the regional post-sovereignty of South-East Europe should not be rejected as a mere post-modernist chimera. For, if that is a chimera, then the enlarged European Union as *a single Europe in tendency and latency* and as a post-modern geopolitical trajectory failed even before it has reached the mind, the language, the world of political and economic practice. However, this large multi-ethnic community, with all its internal contradictions, is still being constructed as the supra-national democratic form. There is a place for South-East Europe on that great journey. But only on condition that energetic points in our minds open up to a new way of thinking that is not a slave to the devil of national sovereignty and that does not escape into the security of ethnic solitude.

In line with such understanding of regional reality, new security forms are perceived as a possibility of relative understanding of Hegel's words that *the state is walking God*. By building regional security institutions that are not managed from Brussels, but that are institutions in themselves, *par excellence*, capable of managing different sorts of crises, the previously expressed position that security is only and solely national, and as such is only in solely an instrument of the State form, becomes relative.

This idea on national sovereignty as of the golden calf of history is worth questioning since in the Balkan it mainly produced nothing but "misery of territorial disputes" (Bibo, 1996, 65) as a result of the *deformation in political culture* (Bibo, *ibid.*). But how come, if the history itself speaks predominantly the language of sovereignty, the language of a contained space, the language of barriers?

⁵ The phrase *third Europe* emphasizes the geopolitical separation of Southeast Europe from Eastern Europe. Eastern Europe is treated as the "second Europe" that is on its way to join the "first Europe", through security (NATO) and political and economic (European Union) arrangements. Southeast Europe is still on hold and is, actually, constituted as a region on hold, which is a necessary and sufficient challenge to build its own geopolitical, geo-economic and geo-cultural personality. Still, it is interesting to note the positioning of the Balkan as the *first Europe*, instead of the third Europe. That view was courageously presented by Trajan Stojanovic (whose mentor was the famous Fernand Braudel) and he, in the spirit of Braudel's book *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the times of Philip II*, calls our part of Europe the *first Europe*, not agreeing to the *northern perception of Europe as limited to "the group of cultures north of the Balkan"* (Stojanovic, 1997, 23) For Stojanovic, Balkan is a component part of the first Europe. Its excluding from the new Europe, as well as the structure of the new Europe founded on money and power, rather than on culture, might lead to Europe's suicide." (Stojanovic, 1997, 23)

Yes, but history is not finished. And it is our only chance. Its advantage lies in the fact that, though it is the only one, it is epochal. Therefore, the connection to the future. Or a link that requires the following question: "Are there passable ways for consolidation of this space and is it possible to put the political development of these countries back on the right path, the path they have gone astray from?" (Bibo, *ibid.* 77)

Utopian discourse: small Balkan without big nationalisms

We will get the answer if we ask ourselves how would our small Balkan look if the nationalist elites had not "gone astray"? There would not have been violence. So let's ask ourselves, together with the renowned British historian, "how might the Balkans look if the sign of violence was lifted for a moment?" (Mazower, 2003,160) and let's remember his answer: "it is true that serious threats to peace still exist in southeastern Europe, perhaps more serious than elsewhere... while NATO's bombing of Kosovo has solved one problem (Serbian persecution of the Kosovar Albanians), only to create others (Albanian persecution of Serbs, as well as new relationships between Albania, Macedonia, Serbia and Kosovo itself). Just as the nation-building process is more recent and compressed in the Balkans, so ethnic nationalism remains stronger, and civic traditions more fragile than elsewhere. Nevertheless, while Yugoslavia in the 1990s descended into war for its own reasons, other countries in the region followed a more peaceful path." (Mazower, *ibid.*)

During the Cold War, the Balkans developed industrially and created solid material conditions for the development of civic structures, but the ideological division of the world and the fact that the majority of Balkan countries remained in the Soviet interest zone stopped the democratisation of the Balkan. Still, "the ending of the Cold War has allowed the Balkans to participate in a different Europe, whose values are inscribed in its dominant cross-national institutions - the European Union, NATO and CSCE (now the OSCE), for example. And it has transformed them geopolitically too, since they now find themselves at the centre of a greatly expanded market that takes in the Black Sea, the former Soviet Union and Central Asia, offering opportunities for business across a vaster area than any time since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire". (Mazower, *ibid.* 160-161)

These are indicators that suggest a new, different status of the region marked by different sorts of conflicts. South-East Europe is faced with the real historical chance to address its problems in a radically different geopolitical environment, which is not frustratingly negative and dramatically different from the limits existing in other European countries. Moreover, "in the process of stabilisation of the Western Balkan, European role is a long-term one and of strategic importance... Western Balkan is a regular topic in Central Europe. There is no political meeting of the 25 (EU member states) where this region is not discussed that there's not a single day without decisions on the region passed by different instances of the Security Council and European Commission" (Gentilini, 2004, 101). These decisions are not, in theoretical understanding of the notion, predominantly ideologically motivated. That is a novelty that Mazower

speaks about: " the problems and perspectives for southeastern Europe today are not those of the past, but dilemmas familiar in one form or another to most European countries: how to reconcile older patterns of welfare provision with the competitive pressures of global capitalism; how to provide affordable energy while safe-guarding the natural environment from pollution; how to prevent total decline of rural ways of life, and to build prosperous economies that alone will reduce the attractions of organised crime and allow democracy to flourish." (Mazower, *ibid.*160)

However, if in the public space of the South-East European countries, the building of a *strong regional identity* "that will help it bridge the gap between the tradition and modernity, past and future, conservation and modernization" (Bozilovic, 2003, 248) is neglected, if the national elites continue to produce vertical images of the world dominated by imaginary historical depth of their own ethnicity as opposed to the building of horizontal cartography of the region, that will be the sign that we are outside of the time that is telling us that the geopolitical "imagination is now dominated by the horizontal plane". (Sachs, 2001,34)

That is not the plane of the nation-state⁶ as a vertical historical space, but the plane of the regions and mega-regions as horizontal synthesis of the global and local, which enable the *flourishing of differences in multiple places* (Sachs, *ibid.* 36): "As a rule, regionalism as a political force is nowadays opposed to the nation-state. There are two things that are right about it. First, in many European countries the respective national state majority culture has been privileged, which in extreme cases went as far as to the chauvinistic oppression of minorities. Regionalism is the strength that, on the contrary, re-establishes European normalcy, the way it existed in the pre-nationalist Europe. Besides, the more supranational political communities are being established, though hesitantly, in the Western Europe, the less important role will the nation-state play as the singular subject of all political sovereignties. That what is released through this weakening of identification forces goes today to the benefit of regionalism and, hopefully, of Europe" (Lubbe,1995, 48-49). And consequently, of South-East Europe as well, whose "active regional identity" (Bozilovic, *ibid.*) will be "the defence against negative effects of global processes that can give birth to proponents of unequal relations or strengthen somebody's imperial appetites" (Bozilovic, *ibid.*).

A legitimate objection would be that, as Moren puts it, this means "expecting the unexpected", adding at the same time that "one should keep hoping for the incredible, I am an optipessimist" (Moren, Bozilovic, *ibid.*).

As well as the author of this text.

⁶ Umberto Eco, favourizing in a peculiar way the *logic* of coincidence, predicts that "maybe even before 2100" "...Europe consisting of national states might come to an end...Less stable European countries are already falling apart. In a telematic universe that has been created, two cities, no matter how distant from one another, are in a direct contact; thus, trade and cultural exchange will be established in all the four corners of Europe, with a network of associated cities, while the unit represented by the national state will gradually lose its power". (Eco, 2001, 83, underlined by N.C.)

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